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ABSTRACT
Background and Aim Public health policy development is subject to a range of stakeholders presenting their arguments
to influence opinion on the best options for policy action. This paper compares stakeholders’ positions in the discourse net-
works of two pricing policy debates in the United Kingdom: minimum unit pricing for alcohol (MUP) and the soft drinks
industry levy (SDIL). Design Discourse analysis was combined with network visualization to create representations of
stakeholders’ positions across the two policy debates as they were represented in 11 national UK newspapers.
Setting United Kingdom. Observations For the MUP debate 1924 statements by 152 people from 87 organizations
were coded from 348 articles. For the SDIL debate 3883 statements by 214 people from 175 organizations were coded
from 511 articles.Measurements Network analysis techniques were used to identify robust argumentative similarities
and maximize the identification of network structures. Network measures of size, connectedness and cohesion were used
to compare discourse networks. Findings The networks for both pricing debates involve a similar range of stakeholder
types and form clusters representing policy discourse coalitions. The SDIL network is larger than the MUP network, par-
ticularly the proponents’ cluster, with more than three times as many stakeholders. Both networks have tight clusters of
manufacturers, think-tanks and commercial analysts in the opponents’ coalition. Public health stakeholders appear in
both networks, but no health charity or advocacy group is common to both. Conclusion A comparison of the discourse
in the UK press during the policy development processes for minimum unit pricing for alcohol and the soft drinks industry
levy suggests greater cross-sector collaboration among policy opponents than proponents.
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INTRODUCTION
The global rise in non-communicable diseases (NCDs) can
be understood as ‘industrial epidemics’ driven at least in
part by powerful corporations and their allies promoting
products that are also disease agents [1]. Decades of
mounting evidence on the tobacco industry highlighted
its detrimental effect on health and brought about the in-
troduction of upstream policies targeting price, marketing
and availability. More recently, UK public health
policymakers have turned their attention to upstream pol-
icy interventions targeting alcohol and sugar. There is
growing evidence that the alcohol industry and
ultra-processed food and drink industry use similar
strategies to the tobacco industry to undermine effective
public health policies [2–4].
Public health policy development is subject to a range of
stakeholders presenting their arguments in the news me-
dia on the best options for policy action [5–7]. In this re-
spect, the news media can be seen as important in
contributing to agenda-setting [8] and in shaping public
and policy opinion on the acceptability of public health pol-
icies [9–11]. Two recent examples of controversial pricing
policy options that prompted intense media debates
throughout the United Kingdom were minimum unit pric-
ing (MUP) for alcohol and the soft drinks industry levy
(SDIL). Both policy options were considered by the UKGov-
ernment. However, while the SDIL was implemented
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throughout the United Kingdom in 2018, the introduction
of MUP in Englandwas placed on hold indefinitely in 2013,
despite being included in the UKGovernment’s 2012 Alco-
hol Strategy [12]. Meanwhile, in June 2012, the Scottish
Government passed the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) Scot-
land Act 2012, paving the way for MUP in Scotland [13].
The MUP pricing policy targets the sale of cheap,
high-strength alcohol to reduce alcohol consumption and
related harms. After a failed legal challenge [14], in May
2018 a minimum price of 50p per unit was implemented
in Scotland [15]. Arguments in support of MUP, appearing
in the UK press, largely related to concerns about high
levels of problem drinking; its effect on public health and
public order; and a widespread belief that most of the alco-
hol that contributes to drunken behaviour is irresponsibly
priced and sold [7,16]. Key opposing arguments in the de-
bate positioned the policy as an illegal barrier to fair trade
that would harm the economy and penalize responsible
drinkers [7].
Public Health England’s report, ‘Sugar Reduction: The
Evidence for Action’, highlighted the high levels of sugar
consumption and associated health harms [17]. The report
recommended a broad range of measures, including the in-
troduction of a tax on high sugar products. In the March
2016 budget, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Os-
borne, announced the Conservative Government’s inten-
tion to introduce the SDIL [18]. They intended that the
SDIL would encourage producers to re-formulate products
with a reduced sugar content to avoid paying the levy [19].
Following a consultation period, the levywas introduced in
April 2018 and set at 18p per litre on soft drinks with a to-
tal sugar content of 5 g or more per 100millilitres, and 24p
per litre for those with 8 g or more per 100 millilitres. The
levy was to apply to all sugar-sweetened beverages except
pure fruit juices (with no added sugar) and drinks with a
high milk content. Key supportive arguments appearing
in the UK press centred on the extent of the health harm
caused by excess sugar consumption; that such a policy
was a necessarygovernment intervention as part of a pack-
age of measures; and that voluntary industry codes, such
as the Public Health Responsibility Deal, had been ineffec-
tive [6]. Opposing arguments emphasized that industry
was already taking voluntary action and playing an active
role in health promotion, therefore further regulation was
unnecessary;any form of taxation would be ineffective in
tackling the complex problem of obesity; and such mea-
sures would cause economic harm to industry and the
wider economy [6].
Successful implementation of ‘controversial’ health pol-
icies requires a high level of political commitment and sup-
port from advocacy stakeholders [20,21]. It has been
argued that interest groups that present a united front
may be more effective in having their preferred policy op-
tion adopted than if they work separately [22]. Indeed,
Rasmussen and colleagues suggest that the likelihood of
advocacy success increases when advocates publicly sup-
port each other’s position [23]. Hawkins & McCambridge
suggest that a factor in the failure to implementMUP in En-
gland was that health advocates were initially underpre-
pared and did not present consistent arguments for the
policy in themedia [21]. Conversely, the complex corporate
relationships that exist between unhealthy commodity in-
dustries may represent an opportunity for strategic
cross-industry collaboration and result in more coherent
alignment of media messaging when seeking to influence
policy development [24–26]. Smith and colleagues high-
light the need for research to ‘better understand how proc-
essed food, soft drinks, and alcohol industries influence
public, political, and policy debates’, in order to understand
how to mitigate against industry messaging and success-
fully advocate for public health policy via the media [27].
This study seeks to address calls for research to com-
pare stakeholder influencing activities across industry sec-
tors [24,25,27].We use discourse network analysis (DNA),
a research method that allows the analysis and visualiza-
tion of actor-based debates using network analysis, to ex-
plore the complex web of arguments, or discourse
coalitions [28], that form when stakeholders seek to pub-
licly influence government policy [29,30]. Previous studies
have used DNA to describe the appearance of discourse co-
alitions in support of, and opposition to, MUP and SDIL
[6,7]. In the recent commentary on Fergie et al., Schmidt
highlights that this methodology is ‘likely to prove a partic-
ularly valuable tool for comparative research, allowing effi-
cient, systematic, rigorous analysis to compare policy
debates internationally and across multiple unhealthy
products’ [31].
Here we aim to build on our previous DNA studies and
use this methodology to compare stakeholders’ positions in
the discourse networks across two pricing policy debates,
MUP for alcohol and the SDIL, as represented in UK news-
papers. The comparison of MUPand SDIL is an appropriate
case study, as they are both examples of ‘sin taxes’ (pricing
policies targeting products deemed harmful to society and
individuals) [32,33]; intended to be UK-wide policies; and
attracted a very public debate in the news media which,
in turn, affected their chances of policy adoption. Specific
research questions are: (i) what are the similarities and dif-
ferences in the policy discourse networks’ composition and
structure; (ii) how does the composition of coalitions differ
between the two debates and what might this tell us about
policy beliefs and advocacy strategies; and (iii) how do the
arguments that polarize the coalitions differ?
METHODS
Pre-existing discourse network analyses on MUP [7] and
SDIL [6] were employed as test cases to examine how
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DNA could be used as a comparative methodology. While
the policy context was somewhat different for the two de-
bates, both controversial policies drew significantmedia at-
tention with clear polarization in stakeholder views, thus
providing a useful case study. Additionally, although MUP
was only finally implemented in Scotland, it was originally
proposed as a UK-wide policy and included in the UK Gov-
ernment’s Alcohol Strategy [12].
We searched articles from 11 national UK newspapers,
representing all political views and genres, in the months
preceding and following key policy announcements: be-
tweenMay 2011 and November 2012 for theMUP debate;
and between May 2015 and November 2016 for the SDIL
debate. Stakeholder statements were identified and coded
using the Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) software
[34], a qualitative content analysis software tool which
combines category-based content analysis with network
analysis [29,35]. Each coded statement consists of four
variables: the person’s name, their organizational affilia-
tion, the argument to which the subject refers (further
called ‘concept’) and a binary qualifier indicating the stake-
holder’s agreement or disagreement with the concept.
Weighted one-mode networks of stakeholders were created
for both debates and exported from DNA as
stakeholder × stakeholder matrices, using the ‘subtract’
transformation with ‘average activity normalization’ [29].
These procedures create a network in which a tie connects
any two stakeholder nodes if they agree (more than they
disagree) with each other, regarding the concepts in the de-
bate. The methods used to create the separate policy dis-
course networks are described in detail elsewhere [6,7].
To allow comparison between the pricing debates, com-
mon concepts were harmonized wherever possible. For ex-
ample, ‘the policy will reduce consumption of the
commodity’ was used in favour of ‘MUP will reduce con-
sumption of alcohol’ and ‘the SDIL will reduce consump-
tion of sugar-sweetened beverages’. Concepts that were
unique to only one debate were not harmonized; for exam-
ple, ‘industry plays an active role in public health promo-
tion’ was specific only to the SDIL debate. For the MUP
debate, 1924 statements by 152 people from 87 organiza-
tions were coded in 348 articles. For the SDIL debate, 3883
statements by 214 people from 175 organizations were
coded in 511 articles. A total of 63 concepts were identi-
fied. Twenty-nine concepts were common to both debates,
17 unique to MUP, and a further 17 unique to SDIL. See
Supporting information for a full list of concepts
(Supporting information, Data S1) and stakeholder organi-
zations (Supporting information, Data S2) appearing in
each debate.
Networks were plotted in Visone (a software tool that
allows the visualization and analysis of network structures
in network data sets, such as those exported from the DNA
software) [36]. Ties between actors represent common
agreement or common disagreement with a specific con-
cept or argument. A tie weight threshold equivalent to
the 67th percentile was applied to the signed network to
reduce ties to only relatively robust argumentative similar-
ities and to maximize the identification of both network
structures. The 67th percentile (equivalent tie weight
thresholds 0.400 forMUPand 0.333 for SDIL) was selected
to ensure that the networks could be directly compared.
The Girvan–Newman edge-betweenness community de-
tection algorithm (an algorithm to identify clusters, or dis-
course coalitions, in the network, i.e. groups of actors with
a similar argumentative position) [37] was used to identify
clusters of stakeholder subgroups with argumentative sim-
ilarities within the discourse network. These clusters can
be interpreted as discourse coalitions. The coalitions were
then highlighted using blue hyperplanes, the different
stakeholder types were visualized with common colours
for both debates and the frequencyof codes for stakeholders
was represented by the size of the respective node. Network
measures were used to compare the two networks and
principal coalitions regarding: size—the total number of
nodes (actors) in a network or cluster; density—a measure
of connectedness of actors within a network cluster or the
overall network, expressing the relative number of ties (i.e.
the number of ties as a proportion of the theoretical maxi-
mum) [38]; and the E-I index—a measure of subgroup co-
hesion, i.e. how strongly aligned the actors are internally in
any one cluster versus external alignment with other clus-
ters [39]. The range for E-I index is –1 (all ties are internal
to the coalition) to +1 (all ties are external to the coalition).
We examined the relative use of concepts in each de-
bate by comparing the frequency with which they were
used and the degree of agreement and disagreement. The
concepts that were the most polarizing in each network
were identified by: first, extracting the 15 most frequently
used concepts for MUP and SDIL separately; secondly, cal-
culating the ratio of agreement to disagreement for each
concept; and finally, ordering them by this ratio. As such,
the five most polarizing concepts were those with the
highest ratio in each debate.
The primary research question and analysis plan were




Respiratory quotient Research question (i)What are the
similarities and differences in the policy discourse networks’
composition and structure?
The composition of stakeholders in both networks was sim-
ilar, reflecting the common interests of those participating
in the debates. Both networks included
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politicians/political parties; government advisory bodies;
health professionals/professional associations; health
charities/advocacy groups; universities/academics; think-
tanks/commercial researchers; retailers/retail associations;
manufacturers/associated industries or associations; and
international health organizations. The only stakeholder
types that did not appear in both debates were European
Union (EU) Member States/EU body and the police, which
exclusively appeared in the MUP debate (Figs 1 and 2).
Wine-producing EU Member States were particularly con-
cerned about the legality of MUP, and the police highlighted
MUP as a way of dealing with the violence resulting from
‘problem drinkers’, two issues that were not prominent in
the SDIL debate. The detailed composition and characteris-
tics of each network have been published elsewhere [6,7].
In this article, we focus on the comparison between the
two networks and their respective coalitions.
The structure of both networks formed two discourse
coalitions representing proponents and opponents of the
policies. However, at the chosen tie-weight cut-off, the
MUP coalitions are more distinct. Fewer stakeholders (total
nodes) are engaged in the debate, with almost twice as
many apparent in the SDIL network; 3.3 times as many
in the proponents’ coalition and 1.7 times as many in the
opponents’ coalition (Table 1). This reflects the greater
number of vocal stakeholders in the SDIL debate, particu-
larly in the proponents’ coalition. Additionally, the E-I in-
dex for proponents of SDIL is low compared with the
other three coalitions (Table 1), indicating that members
of this coalition were even more likely to agree with each
other than with stakeholders outside the coalition, com-
pared to the other coalitions.
Composition of coalitions
RQ (ii) How does the composition of coalitions differ across the
two debates, and what might this tell us about policy beliefs?
Highlighting the 10 most active stakeholder organizations
in each debate reveals that in both cases the commodity
manufacturers and associated industry stakeholders
(brown nodes) play prominent roles in opponents’
Figure 1 Minimum unit pricing (MUP) discourse network analysis (DNA) network showing stakeholder organizations colour-coded by stakeholder
type. Tie weight cut-off at 67th percentile, i.e.< 0.400. Nodes sized by frequency in the debate [Colour figure can be viewed atwileyonlinelibrary.com]
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coalitions and are closely aligned with think-tanks and
commercial researchers (teal nodes) (Figs 3 and 4). Associ-
ations representing manufacturers of the products under
scrutiny are dominant spokespeople in both debates, in
particular the Scottish Whisky Association and the Wine
and Spirit Trade Association for MUP and the British Soft
Drinks Association for SDIL. However, the SDIL network
also features a prominent manufacturer (Coca-Cola) and
an association representing related industries (the UK Food
and Drink Federation).
The SDIL proponents’ coalition features active stake-
holders from awider range of public health advocates [gov-
ernment advisory bodies (pink nodes), particularly Public
Health England, together with health charities and advo-
cacy groups (purple nodes)] than seen in the MUP net-
work. Six of the most active stakeholders are from these
groups compared with only one (Alcohol Concern) for
MUP. Other active stakeholders in the MUP proponents’ co-
alition are two professional associations (British Medical
Association and the Royal College of Physicians) and one
academic institution (University of Sheffield). While aca-
demic researchers are apparent in the SDIL network, they
are not among the 10 most prominent stakeholders
appearing in this debate.
Political stakeholders (gold nodes) appear among the
two coalitions in both networks. However, only the Conser-
vative party is among the most active stakeholders in the
SDIL network, compared with four political parties in the
MUP network [the Conservatives, Scottish National Party
(SNP), Scottish Government and Scottish Labour]. This re-
flects the origins of MUP as an SNP policy targeting what
was framed as a Scottish issue of harmful drinking. In both
networks, the Conservative party is towards the middle of
the networks. However, in both cases this does not reflect
a brokering role, but either a change in ideology over the
course of the debate (for SDIL, the Conservative shift in po-
sition in the middle of the period studied) or splits within
the party on the issue (for MUP, prominent politicians
openly taking opposing positions over the course of the pe-
riod studied).
Despite similar patterns in the types of organizations
making up the proponents’ and opponents’ coalitions
across the two debates, only 30 organizational stake-
holders are common to both (Table 2). This suggests that
the debates are relatively sparsely connected to each other
through common stakeholders, despite their topical
similarity.
Apart from policymakers (political parties, government
departments and advisory bodies), organizations from two
other categories of stakeholders contribute to both the
MUP and SDIL debates (Figs 5 and 6). Four think-tanks
and commercial researchers (Adam Smith Institute, Insti-
tute of Economic Affairs, Institute for Fiscal Studies and
the TaxPayer’s Alliance) and six retailers or retail
Figure 2 Soft drinks industry levy (SDIL) discourse network analysis (DNA) network showing stakeholder organizations colour-coded by stake-
holder type. Tie weight cut-off at 67th percentile, i.e. < 0.333. Nodes sized by frequency in the debate [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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associations (Asda, Sainsbury’s, Tesco, British Retail Con-
sortium, Scottish Retail Consortium and Scottish Grocers
Federation) appear in both debates. Think-tanks and com-
mercial researchers (teal nodes) appear exclusively in the
opponents’ coalitions, while the retailers and retail associa-
tions (green nodes) are spread across both coalitions in
both debates. In relation to MUP, few retailers are central
to the proponents’ coalition, unlike in the SDIL debate,
where some retail stakeholders (e.g. Sainsbury’s and the
British Retail Consortium) are integrated into the propo-
nents’ coalition with strong belief ties to key policy
proponents.
It is noteworthy that, in contrast, there were no health
charities or advocacy groups common to both debates, de-
spite a range of these organizations being very active and
central to the proponents’ coalitions within each debate.
Similarly, while universities and academic researchers ap-
pear in one or other debate, only the University of Birming-
ham is common to both.
Polarizing arguments
RQ (iii) How do the arguments that polarize the coalitions
differ?
Of the top five concepts that lead to the formation of coali-
tions in the two networks, two concepts are common to
both (Table 3). ‘Policy is supported by the evidence’ is the
most polarizing concept for both networks and ‘policy will
reduce consumption of the commodity’ is the third and
fourth most polarizing concept for MUP and SDIL, respec-
tively. Three of the most polarizing concepts are unique to
one or other of the debates: ‘policy will penalize responsible
consumers’ for MUP; ‘industry is taking voluntary actions’
and ‘industry plays an active role in public health promo-
tion’ for SDIL. Of note is the fact that the two most fre-
quently cited arguments in the SDIL debate do not appear
as significant polarizing concepts, i.e. ‘policy needed to ad-
dress commodity problem’ and ‘commodity consumption
causes health harm’. These concepts relate to the framing
of the problem in relation to population-level health harm
and the need for a policy response. Conversely, the two
most frequently cited arguments in the MUP debate result
in network polarization, i.e. ‘policy will reduce consump-
tion of the commodity’ and ‘policy is illegal’. In contrast,
these concepts relate to the framing of the solution and
its probable effectiveness and legality. Thus, the most fre-
quently cited arguments in the SDIL debate do not result
in polarization of the network, suggesting a high degree
of agreement about the extent of the problem resulting in
more closely integrated coalitions.
DISCUSSION
There are calls for more nuanced analyses of stakeholder
engagement in health policy development [24,27,31]. It
has been suggested that research should compare stake-
holders across multiple unhealthy products and related
policies [31]. Using DNA methods, this study presents the
first direct comparison of the discourse coalitions that were
evident in the UK press during the policy development pro-
cesses for MUP and the SDIL. Both networks show similar-
ities in terms of structure, proponents’ and opponents’
coalitions and similar stakeholder types. However, impor-
tant differences are revealed in terms of network size and
complexity; the relative prominence, and lack thereof, of
key stakeholders; subtle differences in the position of indus-
try subsegments between networks; and the relative polar-
izing impact of frequently cited arguments.
Proponents of the pricing policies in both debates in-
cluded public health, health charities, advocacy groups
and academics. While these stakeholders were present in
both debates, few specific organizations were common to
both, suggesting that such proponents tend to make media
statements focusing on their area of policy interest.While it
is clear that policy advocates are already working across
sectors; for example, in the guise of the Cross Party Group
on Improving Scotland’s Health: 2021 and Beyond [40],
and health alliances across the United Kingdom and inter-
nationally, this study suggests that they may not optimize
their media messaging with regard to pricing policies.
The World Health Organization (WHO) identifies such up-
stream policies as ‘best buys’ to tackle non-communicable
Table 1 Network comparisons.
Network measures MUP SDIL
Whole network
Total nodes 87 175




Total ties 365 1,900
Internal ties 287 1,739
External ties 78 161
Ties to opponents’ coalition 60 155
Density 27% 15%
E-I index –0.57 –0.83
Opponents coalition
Nodes 35 60
Total ties 301 715
Internal ties 231 558
External ties 70 157
Ties to proponents’ coalition 60 155
Density 19% 16%
E-I index –0.53 –0.56
MUP = minimum unit pricing; SDIL = soft drinks industry levy
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diseases across all life-style factors [41]. There may be po-
tential space for further cross-sector public health advo-
cacy in support of pricing policies, by elevating the debate
and presenting arguments across policy debates in support
of their counterparts. Advocates could thus increase their
chances of achieving policy congruence, as suggested by
Rasmussen and others [23,42].
In contrast, opponents of regulatory pricing policies
were present in both policy debates, specifically those with
a vested interest in the economic impact of both policies
such as retailers, representatives of licensed premises and
commercial researchers. This structural similarity suggests
industry stakeholders hold comparable discourse positions,
supporting the idea of a common industry ‘playbook’, facil-
itated by public spokespeople, as suggested by Petticrew
et al. [43]. The same four free market think-tanks and com-
mercial researchers appear embedded in both opponents’
coalitions, closely tied to industry stakeholders, suggesting
similar market justice rhetoric based on commercial ideol-
ogy [44,45].
Comparing alcohol and tobacco strategies, Savell and
colleagues suggest that there are commonalities, including
both sectors providing skewed interpretations of evidence
while also promoting voluntary codes, based on establish-
ing themselves as acting responsibly in relation to health
[4]. Our findings support this by suggesting that both sides
focus on the availability and quality of evidence and this is
the most significant polarizing argument in both networks.
There may be an opportunity for policy advocates and ac-
ademics to focus their advocacy efforts in the media on
stressing the importance of weight of evidence, strength
of evidence, source of evidence and how it is best used. Po-
larizing concepts appearing in the SDIL debate but absent
in the MUP debate are ‘industry is taking voluntary action’
and ‘industry plays an active role in public health promo-
tion’. This lends support to Nixon et al.’s findings that the
food and drinks industry seeks to establish themselves as
an exceptional case that should not be subject to the same
controls as producers of other health-harming products,
and is a key part of their corporate social responsibility rhe-
toric [6,46]. However, Collin et al. highlight the linkages
that exist across tobacco, alcohol and ultra-processed food
companies, positing the idea of a single unhealthy
Figure 3 Discourse network analysis (DNA) network highlighting the 10 most active stakeholder organizations in the minimum unit pricing (MUP)
debate. BMA = British Medical Association [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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commodity industry requiring a consistent regulatory ap-
proach [2].
A key difference between the two networks is the
number and distribution of associated industry stake-
holders such as retailers and restaurants, with a greater
number in the SDIL network, including the active voice
of the UK Food and Drink Federation. Six key retailers
are common to both debates but appear in different po-
sitions. For example, the British Retail Consortium and
Sainsbury’s appear as proponents of SDIL and opponents
of MUP, whereas Tesco occupies inverse positions. This,
together with wider industry engagement in the SDIL
debate, reinforces the need to clearly define industry
subsegments and their policy positions, as suggested by
Collin et al. [24]. Policy advocates may benefit from un-
derstanding the policy responses of multiple industry
subsegments to effectively counter policy objections and
leverage potential policy support.
Figure 4 Discourse network analysis (DNA) network highlighting the 10most active stakeholder organizations in the soft drinks industry levy (SDIL)
debate. NOF = National Obesity Forum [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Table 2 Common stakeholders appearing in both networks.
Stakeholder category Specific stakeholders appearing in both networks
Politician/political party Conservatives/Labour/Liberal Democrats Scottish Conservatives/ Scottish Labour/Scottish Liberal
Democrats/SNP/UK Government/UK Government Department of Health/HM Treasury
Local Government Association




British Medical Association/Royal College of Physicians
/Faculty of Public Health/NHS
Health charity/advocacy group
University/academic researcher University of Birmingham
Think-tank/commercial researcher Adam Smith Institute/Institute of Economic Affairs/Institute for Fiscal Studies/TaxPayers’ Alliance




British Beer and Pub Association/JD Wetherspoon
International health organization
EU Member State or EU body
Police
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One of the limitations of this study, which examines the
debates as static networks, is that it does not allow analysis
of subtle shifts over time. While the change in position of
the Conservative Party in the SDIL debate was the only
fundamental change in ideological position, there was an
ongoing interplay of subtle shifts in emphasis and relative
prominence of arguments over time in both debates. Fu-
ture studies would benefit from comparing network devel-
opment over time. Secondly, harmonizing the concepts for
the two debates may have resulted in the loss of some nu-
anced arguments. However, the coders of the two debates
worked together to ensure consistency and minimize this
risk. Thirdly, the periods studied for each debate were
4 years apart: 2011–12 for MUP and 2015–16 for SDIL.
The passage of time could have influenced stakeholders’
strategies and the nature of their responses to proposed fis-
cal policy. However, we chose these time-periods deliber-
ately to examine the debates at similar stages of policy
development. Finally, while we recognize the importance
of the digital world of echo chambers, tailored information
and micro-targeting, which means that social media plays
an increasing role in influencing the policy agenda [47],
traditional newspapers remain an important barometer of
the current political agenda.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this visualization of the discourse net-
works apparent in the debates on pricing policies span-
ning two unhealthy commodity industries may
represent a manifestation of the underlying discursive
strategies (manipulation or framing of a set of argu-
ments by actors in order to achieve a certain goal)
employed by policy stakeholders to influence policy
makers and the public, via the news media. The net-
work comparison is suggestive of greater cross-sector
collaboration among policy opponents than proponents.
Our analysis also suggests that, in seeking policy con-
gruence, there may be a space for further cross-sector
public health advocacy, by presenting arguments across
policy debates in support of their counterparts. However,
we recognize there are potential barriers to this model,
not least resource constraints and the risk of mission
creep for some public health advocates. Given the limited
presence of academic institutions across the networks,
Figure 5 Discourse network analysis (DNA) network illustrating where stakeholder organizations common to both debates appear in the minimum
unit pricing (MUP) network. BMA = British Medical Association [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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and the importance of statements relating to evidence in
polarizing both networks, we suggest that academics
contribute more frequently on issues relating to evidence
in policy debates. Finally, we suggest that DNA could
usefully be applied to compare other policy debates over
time and across countries, in attempting to tackle NCDs.
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Table 3 Most polarizing concepts used and level of prominence in each debate.
Rank as a polarizing concept in the MUP debate Prominencea MUP Prominence SDIL
Policy is supported by evidence 1 13 8
Responsibility deals with industry are ineffective 2 16 21
Policy will reduce consumption of commodity 3 1 3
Policy will penalize responsible consumersb 4 6 –
Policy is illegal 5 2 35
Rank as a polarizing concept in the SDIL debate Prominence SDIL Prominence MUP
Policy is supported by evidence 1 8 13
Industry taking voluntary actionb 2 5 –
Policy will improve population health 3 4 3
Policy will reduce consumption of commodity 4 3 1
Industry plays an active role in public health promotionb 5 13 –
aProminence indicates relative frequency of use in each debate (rank 1 = most frequently used); bitalics = concept unique to one network. MUP = minimum
unit pricing; SDIL = soft drinks industry levy.
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